It was unjust for a Crown Court judge to order that a foreign travel order begin afresh from the date on which he had dismissed an appeal by an offender against that order. The order was to run from the date on which it had originally been made.
APPEAL REFUSED AGAINST ORDER IMPOSED ON RETURN TO UK COMMENCEMENT DATE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOREIGN TRAVEL ORDERS PENOLOGY AND CRIMINOLOGY RELEVANT COMMENCEMENT DATE s.114 s.115(2) s.117 s.117(3) s.117(5) s.118 s.118(5) s.119 s.119(2) s.122 s.97 SEXUAL ACTIVITY WITH CHILDREN SEXUAL HARM PREVENTION ORDERS SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 Pt 2 UK CITIZEN CONVICTED OF CHILD SEX OFFENCES ABROAD
The practice of police officers visiting the homes of registered sex offenders for the purpose of monitoring their behaviour under arrangements made pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.325 did not constitute an unlawful interference with the offenders’ rights under the ECHR art.8.
art.8(2) CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003 s.325 ENTRY AND SEARCH EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1950 art.8 HUMAN RIGHTS LAWFULNESS OF HOME VISITS BY POLICE MONITORING NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PENOLOGY AND CRIMINOLOGY POLICE POWERS OF ENTRY RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE s.325(8) s.80(2) s.91A s.96B SEX OFFENDERS SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 Pt 2
Magistrates had erred in dismissing the appeal of a convicted sex offender against a decision of a detective, acting on behalf of the chief constable, not to end the offender’s notification requirements.
CARLTONA PRINCIPLE CHIEF CONSTABLES CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DELEGATED POWERS DELEGATION DELEGATION OF CHIEF CONSTABLE’S DUTY NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS POLICE Pt 3 REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 S.91B s.1(3)(b) s.104(1) s.109(3) s.14 s.2 s.2(1) s.2(3) s.2(4) s.3 s.8 s.80(1) s.81(1) s.81(3)(c) s.83 s.83(5) s.83(5)(h) s.85 s.85(1) s.86 s.87 s.88A s.91 s.91A s.91A(1) s.91A(2) s.91A(4) s.91A(5) s.91B s.91B(1) s.91B(11)(b) s.91B(2) s.91B(2)(b) s.91B(4) s.91B(8)(b) s.91B(9) s.91C s.91C(1) s.91C(2) s.91C(3)(a) s.91C(4) s.91D s.91D(1) s.91D(1)(b) s.91D(1)(c) s.91D(2) s.91D(2)(a) s.91E s.91E(1) s.91E(2) s.91E(4) s.91F s.96B s.96B(1)(a) s.97(5) Sch.3 Sch.5 SEX OFFENDERS SEX OFFENDERS ACT 1997 s.1 SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 Pt 2 STATUTORY POWERS
The whole of the term of an extended sentence under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85 constituted the term for which a person was “sentenced to imprisonment” for the purposes of determining the notification period under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.82(1). There was nothing arbitrary or disproportionate about the imposition of an indefinite notification period given the statutory purposes and the existence of review provisions under s.91A to s.91F of the 2003 Act.
art.14 DISCRIMINATION EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1950 art.8 EXTENDED SENTENCES HUMAN RIGHTS IMPRISONMENT LENGTH OF NOTIFICATION PERIOD BASED ON WHOLE OF EXTENDED SENTENCE MEANING OF “SENTENCED TO IMPRISONMENT” IN S.82(1) SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS POWERS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (SENTENCING) ACT 2000 s.85 RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE s.40A s.51(2D) s.76 s.76(1) s.80(1) s.82 s.82(1) s.82(2) s.85(2) s.85(6) s.91A s.91F SENTENCING SEXUAL OFFENCES SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 Pt 2 WHETHER INDEFINITE NOTIFICATION ARBITRARY AND DISPROPORTIONATE