An offender’s conviction for offences of sexual acitivity with a child was not rendered unsafe by the judge’s failure, after allowing a video recording of the complainant’s evidence-in-chief to be replayed to the jury when they had retired to consider their verdict, to expressly warn the jury against giving the replay video evidence a disproportionate […]
Guilty verdicts on two sample counts of rape relating to a six-year period were logically inconsistent with acquittals on four specific counts of rape against the same victim. A reasonable jury could not, on the paucity of the stand-alone evidence concerning the sample counts, be sure of guilt in relation to them if they rejected […]
In a trial concerning conspiracy to rape a child under 13, the judge, when considering a submission of no case to answer, had failed to consider whether a reasonable jury could be entitled to infer that the offenders intended to carry out the agreement. Taking the prosecution evidence at its highest, no reasonable jury could […]
Where a defendant facing charges of sexual offences against young boys had denied being homosexual, but the prosecution had adduced evidence tending to show his homosexual disposition, there was a real risk that the jury might have drawn an inference that that evidence alone tended to show that he also had a propensity to abuse […]
There was no logical inconsistency between an offender’s conviction on two counts of indecent assault upon a girl, and the jury’s acquittal in relation to the remaining 16 counts on the indictment.
A finding of guilt on one count could not be inconsistent with a failure to reach a verdict on another count as no verdict had been reached on that count.
Where a trial proceeded on the basis that different counts of criminal liability required separate consideration and there was a difference in the cogency of detail in the evidence on the different counts, a decision of the jury was not unlawful due to inconsistency where an offender was found guilty on a count of indecency […]
Evidence prejudicial to the defence and of no probative value that had inadvertently been disclosed at the appellant’s trial had resulted in unfairness to the appellant and it was doubtful, given the importance of his good character to his defence, that any directions could have overcome that unfairness.
Where a defendant faced several counts of sexual offences on the same victim, the jury’s verdicts could not be said to be inconsistent where it had convicted the defendant on the only count that had supporting evidence.
A conviction for indecent assault was quashed on grounds of apparent bias on the part of one or more of the jurors. The judge had no firm basis for holding the accused responsible for incidents that led to the bias.
