Rape Defence Barrister

A challenge, by way of judicial review, by a young offender convicted of the murder and rape of a 14-year-old girl, to an excepting direction which discharged a reporting restriction order imposed under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.45(3), was refused.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were deemed unsafe where a judge had failed to give a jury clear directions as to whether, and if so how, they could rely on the evidence of each victim when considering the allegations made by the other.

There was no general principle that delay, in a criminal trial involving young children, meant that the evidence of that child should always be excluded at a subsequent trial; each case was fact specific. In the instant case, a judge had been entitled to admit a child’s Achieving Best Evidence interview at trial despite the delay of two years and four months since the interview had taken place.

Despite the absence of certain evidence at trial, the appellant’s convictions for sexual assault and rape of his half-sister were safe, because the totality of the trial process including the directions given and the summing up was fair.

There might be cases where guidance from the trial judge on myths and stereotypes in rape cases would be appropriate to benefit a defendant, but the instant case, in which the defendant was charged with perjury and perverting the course of justice after making repeated and false allegations of rape, was not one of them. Given the evidence called, even if the guidance had been given, it would not have assisted the defendant.

The Criminal Cases Review Commission had been justified in refusing to refer the claimant’s two convictions for sexual offences to the Court of Appeal. The fresh evidence on which he had sought to rely did not give rise to a real possibility that the convictions would not be upheld.

A total extended sentence of seven years and six months’ imprisonment for historic offences of attempted buggery, indecency with a child and indecent assault on a man committed by an individual aged 20-25 against his neighbour aged 10-14, whilst lenient, was not unduly so. Although aspects of the judge’s reasoning had been flawed, the offences had very unpleasant features and there had been an element of grooming, no violence had been used.

A sentence of three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment imposed on an offender for historic offences of buggery and indecent assault on a fellow resident at a children’s home was unduly lenient. The offender satisfied the dangerousness criteria and a sentence of five years and ten months’ imprisonment with a three-year extension period was appropriate.

A member of a group under police surveillance who had entered into a sexual relationship with an undercover police officer was unable to establish that her lack of knowledge as to the officer’s true identity vitiated her consent to sexual relations within the meaning of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.74. There was no justification for extending the common law position as contended for by the claimant, namely that the matter to which the deception related had to be sufficiently serious in objective terms as to be capable of being regarded as relevant to a woman’s decision-making and that, subjectively, the deception went to a matter which the woman regarded as critical or fundamental to her decision-making.

A 29-year extended sentence, which included a custodial term of 21 years, imposed on a young adult offender following a campaign of rape against victims aged between 13 and 16, was excessive. Insufficient weight had been given to the offender’s age, lack of maturity and unstable background. An extended sentence of 26 years, with an 18-year custodial term, was appropriate.

Although a judge had unnecessarily and improperly intervened during a defendant’s examination-in-chief, the interventions were not so significant as to materially impair the defendant’s ability to put his case before the jury. The judge’s interventions, combined with deficiencies in his summing-up, had not deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

Following the appellant’s retrial for sexual offences, the judge had been correct to impose a special sentence of custody for offenders of particular concern. However, the term imposed, namely a custodial term of 16 years and an extended licence period of one year, contravened the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 Sch.2 para.2(1) because it was “of greater severity” than the 17-year sentence imposed at the original trial. That was because of the release regime applicable to offenders who were subject to a special sentence of custody for offenders of particular concern.

It was best practice for a judge to direct a jury before the cross-examination of a vulnerable witness that limitations had been placed on the defence counsel and to explain after the cross-examination the type of issues which the defendant would have wished to explore in further detail. Such directions should be repeated in the summing up.

A 16-year extended sentence for the rape of an ex-partner was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle where the judge had been entitled to conclude that the offender was dangerous and a post-sentence report documented no change in mentality. There could also be no proper complaint about a concurrent 12-year sentence imposed for a second count of rape against the same victim.

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission had no standing to seek a declaration that abortion law in Northern Ireland was incompatible with ECHR art.3 and art.8 because it had not instituted proceedings by identifying any unlawful act or any actual or potential victim. Although the Supreme Court therefore had no jurisdiction to make a declaration of incompatibility, it considered that the current law was disproportionate and incompatible with art.8 insofar as it prohibited abortion in cases of fatal foetal abnormality and where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest.

A prosecutor’s decision not to charge a man with the rape of a woman with learning difficulties was not irrational. The circumstances of the man’s acquittal some years earlier on charges of sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice were such that the prosecutor had been right to conclude that the man would be able to establish that a second prosecution was an abuse of process.

A judge had not erred when sentencing an offender to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 10 years, as a sentence of “last resort” for extreme child sex offences committed over a number of years against his own children. The sentence was also not unduly lenient, despite the minimum term not being increased when the offender was sentenced for further offences which involved the same children being offered to other men for sexual purposes.

Evidence of a step-father’s controlling behaviour towards his wife and step-son had been relevant evidence at his trial for 16 sexual offences against his step-daughter, as his defence was that his step-daughter was lying and exaggerating his controlling behaviour and the evidence was relevant to the issue of her credibility. A total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

Given the aggravating factors involved in the sexual assault and subsequent rape of the same victim, a judge had been entitled to set the minimum term of a life sentence at over twice the upper limit of the respective sentencing guideline range. However, the sentence was too high and was reduced from nine-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half years.

Where a 19-year-old offender had taken advantage of a 12-year-old girl’s willingness to engage in sexual activity there were no exceptional circumstances that justified a non-custodial sentence; a community order was replaced by a sentence of three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment.

A sentence with a minimum term of nine years and three months’ imprisonment imposed for nine counts of rape was quashed as the minimum term had been wrongly increased by six months to reflect a breach of a suspended sentence imposed for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. The offence for which the suspended sentence had been received was not a specified offence and therefore should not have been added to the minimum term.

Sentences of six years’ imprisonment following a conviction for attempted rape and 30 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently, following a conviction for sexual assault, were not unduly lenient where the judge had taken into account totality, but had been motivated by mercy.

The failure to provide exceptions to the law in Northern Ireland prohibiting abortion in respect of fatal foetal abnormality at any time, and pregnancies due to sexual crime up to the date when a foetus became capable of an existence independent of its mother, was contrary to the ECHR art.8.

A decision to prosecute a 12-year-old boy for rape of a child under 13 had been taken by the Crown Prosecution Service following extensive consideration of its impact on the defendant. There was no basis for saying that its decision was incompatible with his right to respect for his private life under ECHR art.8.

A conviction for sexual offences against a child was safe, as medical evidence adduced as fresh had not permitted confident review of a previous diagnosis so as to describe it as ill-founded; taken at its highest it neither supported nor refuted the allegations against the offender. The defence was still that any abuse was perpetrated by another and the jury had decided on the non-medical evidence.

A sentence of six years’ imprisonment following convictions for historic charges of rape, indecency with a child and sexual assault, committed against a 13-year-old girl, was increased to 12 years’ imprisonment where the judge had departed from the sentencing guidelines without giving reasons for doing so and where the sentence imposed failed to reflect the totality of the offending.

A sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, imposed following convictions for four offences of rape and two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, was increased to 16 years’ imprisonment with an extended licence period of five years, where the offender was dangerous and had committed the offences while serving a community sentence for a previous sexual offence.

After receiving a note indicating that a juror in a rape trial might not make a decision but just go with the majority, the judge should have told the jury that each member had to consider the evidence and reach a verdict according to his or her view of the material. The subsequent conviction by a majority was not, however, unsafe as the foreman had made it unequivocally clear that 10 jurors had agreed and two had disagreed.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a notional determinate sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment for rape, sexual assault and robbery, reduced to 12 years’ after credit for a guilty plea, was not manifestly excessive. The notional determinate sentence had been made to reflect all three offences, and there were significant aggravating factors which justified the high starting point.

The court considered the proper approach to the Victims’ Right to Review Guidance of CPS decisions and to claims made in respect of decisions to charge where the original decision was not to charge.

An extended sentence comprising a 12-year custodial term and a five-year extension period was appropriate in the case of an offender who had vaginally and anally raped a friend, handcuffing her and pressing a pillow over her face. A discretionary life sentence was not justified.

A sentence of 17 years and 2 months’ imprisonment with an eight-year extension period imposed for child sex offences was justified as the offender had carried out the systemic and sustained abuse of his step-daughter from age 6 to 11 and of her cousin, who suffered from autism, at age 12.

The fact that an intermediary had provided physical and emotional support to a vulnerable and distressed complainant during a rape trial did not result in a serious risk of unfairness to the defendant. Both counsel and the judge had warned the jury to approach the complainant’s evidence untrammelled by sympathy.

An 18-month detention and training order was reduced to 12 months where a 16-year-old offender had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity to four offences of rape of a child under 13. The offender and the 12-year-old victim had been in a relationship since meeting at school and, although the judge had been right to impose a custodial sentence, sufficient allowance had not been made for the available mitigation and the need to keep custody to a minimum for young offenders.

An appellant’s conviction for rape was safe where there was substantial evidence before the jury that the victim was intoxicated and incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse with him. There was no presumption that the conviction was unsafe because the judge did not give a good character direction.

When dismissing an appeal against conviction for sexual activity involving children, including rape and trafficking within the UK for sexual exploitation, the court considered the issue of consent. Where a vulnerable or immature individual had allegedly been subjected to grooming for sexual purposes, the question of whether real or proper consent had been given would usually be for the jury to decide, unless the evidence clearly indicated that proper consent had been given.

Sentences of nine years’ imprisonment were neither unduly lenient nor manifestly excessive for two offenders who had raped an intoxicated young woman in an alleyway outside a nightclub. It had been appropriate not to impose a consecutive sentence for digital anal penetration by one of the offenders.

The Northern Ireland Public Prosecution Service had not erred in making a decision not to prosecute an alleged rape of a 14-year-old boy with moderate learning difficulties; there was a clear factual basis for the finding that there were insufficient grounds to mount a prosecution.

Undisclosed historic material from the police and social services which included information regarding previous sexual allegations made by a rape victim that had not been pursued because of concerns expressed by professionals regarding her credibility did not significantly undermine the victim’s credibility so as to affect the safety of the offender’s conviction.

A district judge had failed to appreciate when deciding to retain jurisdiction to prosecute a young offender in the youth court for child sex offences that an amendment to the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.3B introduced by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 s.53 was not in force when he made his decision.

Life sentences coupled with minimum terms ranging from 17 to 12 years were appropriate in the case of four men who had been convicted of serious sexual offences following their involvement in one of the worst cases of child exploitation to come before the courts.

Fresh evidence which cast doubt on the credibility of a complainant’s evidence had sufficient impact on the safety of a conviction for rape for it to be quashed. However, the evidence did not have the same impact on the complainant’s credibility in respect of allegations of sexual assault, which were upheld.

A judge had erred in focusing on the risk an offender posed to the public, rather than the seriousness of the offences, when imposing what was in effect a whole life order for multiple counts of rape and further counts of kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The very high test of exceptionality for whole life orders had not been fulfilled but, given the aggravating features of the case, a notional determinate sentence beyond the sentencing guideline range was justified.

Two convictions for rape were safe where a judge had admitted evidence of an offender’s single previous conviction for sexual assault. The offences all demonstrated sufficiently unusual behaviour, capable of demonstrating the offender’s propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, to permit admission under the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Although a judge had, without hearing submissions, given a Watson direction which deviated from the approved wording, the direction did not render a conviction for rape unsafe. Whether and when to give a direction was a matter for the judge’s discretion, provided that it was given in a way which did not put pressure on jurors.

A judge had not erred in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of an offender’s bad character, relating to conduct forming the basis of a charge for sexual assault, of which he was acquitted, after it had closed its case as the defence had not yet opened its case. The judge had also directed the jury fairly on the similarities and dissimilarities between the previous incident and the index offence.

A judge had erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of a rape complainant regarding her previous convictions, as the evidence was of substantial probative value in respect of the question of whether her allegation was worthy of belief. However, the evidence would have had no significant impact on the jury’s consideration of the specific issues of creditworthiness in the circumstances of the case and the conviction was safe.

An extended sentence of 39 years, with a custodial term of 33 years, imposed in respect of a very large number of serious sexual offences against young girls was manifestly excessive; the appropriate custodial term was 30 years. The judge had also erred in adding up the consecutive sentences to reach the overall custodial term before imposing an extension period on the total: it was the overall extended determinate sentences that had to be consecutive, not just the custodial terms.

A multiple-counts indictment under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 r.14.2(2), which allowed multiple instances of similar offences to be charged as a course of conduct, would not be properly drafted unless it specified a minimum number of occasions on which the offending was alleged to have happened. Otherwise, where a defendant was convicted on such an indictment, a sentencing judge could not know how many times the jury believed the offence to have been committed, and fairness would require him to sentence on the basis that it was more than once, but no more than twice.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner who had been sentenced to imprisonment for public protection when his offence pre-dated the coming into force of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 failed. The sentencing judge had had competent jurisdiction to direct both imprisonment and a minimum term. Her order could not, therefore, be ignored as a suspected nullity; it had to be obeyed unless and until it was set aside on appeal.

A judge had not erred in stating that an appellant’s bad character had been agreed during a rape trial in which both the appellant and victim had impugned each other in their evidence. The conviction was safe despite the fact that allegations of past violence by the appellant had been made. The judge’s direction had been adequate to deal with the issue.

A suspended sentence which had been imposed on a man who suffered from Tourette’s syndrome and other disorders following his plea of guilty to rape was unduly lenient; however, given his very positive attitude to the suspended sentence order, which had been coupled with a supervision requirement, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the sentence.

A sentence of seven years and two months’ imprisonment following late guilty pleas to three counts of rape was increased to 10 years where the sentencing judge had taken a starting point that had been too low and had given too great a discount for the offender’s pleas and previous good character.

A judge had been right to refuse severance of a defendant’s indictment for child abduction from his co-defendants’ additional indictments for rape. The jury had not misunderstood the scope or nature of the case against the defendant, they had been directed carefully and the summing up had been clear.

A non-custodial sentence was unduly lenient for a young offender of previous good character who had pleaded guilty to sexual offences involving a girl under 13: a custodial sentence of two and a half years was substituted.

A judge had not diluted a good character direction by directing a jury that to the extent that they accepted evidence of misconduct additional to that contained on the indictment, they would want to consider whether that evidence reduced the weight which they gave to the fact that the defendant had no previous convictions.

It was doubtful whether there was still a rule that prosecuting counsel could not make a closing speech where the accused was unrepresented. It was preferable to approach the issue as a matter of balance and fairness: it was incumbent on a trial judge, faced with an unrepresented accused, to assess all the circumstances of the case and decide whether it would be fair to allow prosecuting counsel to make a speech.

A judge had not erred in admitting evidence of an individual’s previous conviction for possessing an indecent image of a child in his trial for rape and sexual assault of a child. It was admissible as evidence relevant to an issue in the case, namely his inappropriate sexual interest in young girls.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.

The requirement in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 Pt 67 to give immediate notice of an intention to seek permission to appeal against a terminating ruling was a mandatory pre-condition to establish appeal jurisdiction. Prosecution counsel’s failure to give such notice, where he had withdrawn from the case due to professional embarrassment but remained ostensibly holding the prosecution brief, meant that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an application for permission to appeal.

An acquittal on counts of rape and assault by penetration would be quashed and a retrial ordered where the complainant had left the country after giving an achieving best evidence interview and the Crown had offered no evidence at trial. There was new and compelling evidence in the form of the complainant’s evidence which was available when she returned to the country, and a retrial would be in the interests of justice.

It was not arguable that either a total sentence of 29 years’ custody with an extended licence period of six years imposed on a former rock band singer for various sexual offences against children and young persons, or a total sentence of 17 years’ imprisonment imposed on a woman who had allowed the singer to sexually assault her 12-month-old baby daughter, were manifestly excessive.

Where the failure by police to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of rape had been held to amount to breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR art.3, the victims of the rapes were entitled to a financial remedy for harm caused by the police failings on top of sums received in civil claims for the harm caused by the rapes. The court examined the statutory framework, relevant legal principles, previous authorities, and the existence of alternative remedies, and awarded sums of £22,250 and £19,000 respectively.

In a case where the defendant was accused of sexual offences against his daughter, the judge had been correct to refuse to admit the evidence of a retired psychiatrist and psychotherapist: her thesis of false memory syndrome lacked evidence to support it.

A conviction for rape was not unsafe on the basis that the judge should have permitted cross-examination of the victim about the falsity of previous allegations of sexual abuse by other men. The fact that the victim had made but not pursued those allegations did not provide a proper evidential basis for showing the falsity of those complaints for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100.

There was no basis on which to extend time to allow an offender to appeal against his convictions for rape, sexual assault, and causing or inciting a four-year-old child to engage in sexual activity. Although the normal trial process had had to be modified in a number of ways because of the victim’s age, the judge had taken great care to ensure that the trial was fair.

The appellant’s conviction for the rape of his wife was unsafe, given fresh evidence from witnesses which cast doubt on the testimony given by the complainant.

In a trial of charges of sexual offences against the defendant’s daughter and granddaughter, the judge had been entitled to rule that the complainants’ various complaints were mutually cross-admissible. Further, the complainants’ evidence had not been contaminated.

In response to concerns that the principle of double jeopardy was no longer referred to in judgments of the Court of Appeal in references made by the Attorney General, the court expressed its view that, although the double jeopardy principle remained for consideration in the kind of case identified in Attorney General’s Reference (Nos 14 and 15 of 2006) [2006] EWCA Crim 1335, the practice had evolved so that no reference was made to it, save in the rare category of case in which it was likely to arise.

Where there had been confusion during the jury’s return of verdicts on four counts of an indictment against two co-defendants, and a verdict against a count of kidnap was not formally entered against one defendant, that defendant had not been convicted of kidnap. The court therefore ordered the Crown Court record to be amended accordingly and the defendant’s sentence for kidnap was quashed.

A judge had not failed to direct a jury properly on the burden and standard of proof in relation to offences of false imprisonment, assault occasioning bodily harm and rape where he had effectively directed the jury that they had to make a choice whether to believe the evidence of the complainant or the defendants.

A sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a senior police officer who had been convicted of a number of sexual offences against his wife and teenage boys. In a case of this nature, where the offending spanned a long period of time and where there had been significant changes in the legislation, Crown counsel should ensure that assistance was given to the judge in relation to his sentencing powers.

Guilty verdicts on two sample counts of rape relating to a six-year period were logically inconsistent with acquittals on four specific counts of rape against the same victim. A reasonable jury could not, on the paucity of the stand-alone evidence concerning the sample counts, be sure of guilt in relation to them if they rejected the specific events.

A medical expert’s opinion that a 15-year-old girl’s injury to her hymen was diagnostic of blunt force trauma from sexual penetration had not been materially inaccurate and had not misled the jury in the trial of the appellant for raping the girl.

A trial judge had correctly ruled that the contents of a conversation revealing details about a rape victim’s previous sexual behaviour were not admissible under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41.

A rape victim’s evidence that she had little memory of the events was not sufficient for the judge to remove the case from the jury. There had been sufficient evidence for the jury to decide whether the victim had consented.

On the facts of the case, the defendant’s conviction for rape was not rendered unsafe by the judge’s failure, after acceding to a request from the jury for the replaying of the complainant’s ABE interview, to warn the jury not to place too much emphasis on what they had seen during the recording since they had not also viewed, at the same time, the evidence of any other witness, in particular the defendant.

A conviction for attempted rape was quashed following the admission of new DNA evidence taken from clothing worn by the victim at the time of the offence.

A judge had been correct in not permitting a defendant to cross-examine a complainant concerning a telephone recording where the complainant had allegedly confessed to murder, as it was not relevant to the issues in the case, namely whether the complainant had consented to intercourse, and fabricated evidence.

In the circumstances, the fact that a complainant had made an unfounded allegation of rape against an accused in a retrial did not cast doubt on the reliability of her evidence against him in an earlier trial so as to render unsafe his conviction for sexual assault in that earlier trial.

In a case in which the defendant failed to mention in interview a matter on which he later relied in his defence, but that matter was one which the jury might find to be a lie in any event, the judge was right to give a direction which combined elements of a Lucas direction and a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34.

An extended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.

An extended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.

An offender’s convictions for historic offences of rape, buggery, attempted rape, indecent assault and murder were deemed safe, as the judge had given the jury adequate directions as to the dangers of delay and its effect on the evidence.

Following directions from the Lord Chief Justice on the disproportionate use of the judiciary’s scarce resources on hearing sentencing appeals based on a failure to take into account time served on remand, it was clear that that issue should be raised at the sentencing hearing and time limits for such appeals would be applied strictly in future. In an exceptional case, an offender’s sentence for rape was reduced to take account of time when he was subject to a qualified curfew, in fairness to him and where the error had arisen before the guidance, but the guidance would not be departed from in future.

A jury’s findings on a trial of the facts that a defendant with severe learning difficulties who was unfit to plead had committed two offences of rape were safe, notwithstanding the fact that an extract of the defendant’s police interview had been wrongly admitted as evidence.

A jury had been given adequate directions in relation to the issue of consent before it found a defendant guilty of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault following a sexual encounter at a party between the defendant and a woman who was heavily intoxicated. The judge had fully dealt with the elements of capacity and it had not been necessary for him to indicate that a drunken consent remained a consent.

A 30-year delay on the part of a complainant did not render an offender’s convictions for indecent assault, indecency with a child, and rape unsafe as the judge had sufficiently dealt with any prejudice to the offender in his summing up and directions to the jury and there had been other evidence that supported the complainant’s evidence.

A recorder had not erred in refusing a defence application to cross-examine a rape victim pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 in order to question her regarding her sexual relationship with another man.

It had not been logically inconsistent for a jury to find a man accused of sexual activity with a child guilty of having intercourse with her but not guilty of digitally penetrating her as they were separate incidents and the surrounding circumstances of the latter might have led the jury to be not sure beyond a reasonable doubt.

An error on an indictment in respect of the date of the Act under which a charge of rape had been made was a procedural error that caused no prejudice and did not render the indictment or the trial a nullity, as the offender had been aware of the case he had to meet and the trial had proceeded on the basis of the correct Act.

The acquittal of one of three men charged with multiple rapes of a woman over an evening had been explicable on the basis that he had joined the other two after the victim had ceased to show resistance. The judge had properly left the issue of reasonable belief in consent to the jury and had properly given a separate treatment direction.

The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four-and-a-half years following an offender’s conviction for rape and kidnapping could not be faulted, notwithstanding the judge’s failure to set out her reasons for rejecting an extended sentence in her sentencing remarks. An extended sentence had undoubtedly been discussed at the relevant time, and the offender, who posed a serious risk to vulnerable women, was unlikely to comply with the licence conditions under the extended sentence regime.

Although part of prosecuting counsel’s cross-examination of a rape defendant, related to bad character and based on inadmissible hearsay evidence, had been misjudged and regrettable, it had not affected the overall fairness of the proceedings or the safety of the verdict.

Although the delay in the appellant’s prosecution for historic sexual offences was extreme, the resulting missing evidence was not of a degree of cogency that could amount to a finding of serious prejudice in its absence. The trial judge had given the jury appropriate directions regarding the effect of the delay and the appellant’s convictions were safe.

A trial judge had a wide discretion as to what warning, if any, he gave to a jury in relation to a witness’s alleged unreliability. In the instant case, the judge had given an adequate and appropriate warning to the jury with regard to the inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and an admitted lie, and the offender’s conviction for indecent assault and rape was safe.

A sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment for rape was reduced to 10 and a half years where the sentencing judge had failed to have sufficient regard to the unusual circumstances of the offence, in particular the effect upon the offender and the complainant, his former partner, of the death of their child.

The defendant’s convictions for raping his partner were safe where there was expert evidence that his mental illness had not affected his ability to understand whether his partner had consented. Even if that were wrong, delusional beliefs that a victim was consenting could not render reasonable a belief that the victim was consenting when they were not.

A sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of four years imposed on an offender for attempted rape and assault by penetration was unduly lenient and a minimum term of six years was substituted.

Where an 16-year-old offender had committed an offence of rape on an elderly woman, who was his grandmother, alone in her home at night after a forced entry, the circumstances were of such gravity that a sentence of life imprisonment was inevitable.