A judge had been correct in not permitting a defendant to cross-examine a complainant concerning a telephone recording where the complainant had allegedly confessed to murder, as it was not relevant to the issues in the case, namely whether the complainant had consented to intercourse, and fabricated evidence.
A recorder had not erred in refusing a defence application to cross-examine a rape victim pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 in order to question her regarding her sexual relationship with another man.
Although part of prosecuting counsel’s cross-examination of a rape defendant, related to bad character and based on inadmissible hearsay evidence, had been misjudged and regrettable, it had not affected the overall fairness of the proceedings or the safety of the verdict.
A conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.9 could not be substituted for a conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1), as the indictment based on the 1956 Act could not be said to expressly or impliedly include an allegation of an offence under s.9 of the 2003 Act.
Although cross-examination which had invited impermissible speculation by the defendant should not have been allowed, that was insufficient to support a conclusion that his conviction for rape, buggery and indecent assault was unsafe, there being no other basis on which to undermine the jury’s acceptance of the significant DNA evidence.
Where the cross-examination of a complainant under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(1) to show that her allegations of sexual abuse against an individual were false, and therefore that her allegations against the defendant were likely to be false, meant that the jury would have been told about the individual’s limited admissions […]
Where an appellant relied on honest belief that the victim to an indecent assault was willing to consent, whilst evidence of the victim’s previous sexual behaviour was relevant to that belief the judge had a discretion whether to allow cross-examination and had to take into account whether refusal might render the conclusion of the jury […]
In a trial in respect of a number of sexual offences, an application to cross-examine the complainant about what she had said in the past concerning her previous relationships with men was rightly rejected as being contrary to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 . There was nothing inconsistent with guilty verdicts […]
The defendant’s conviction was unsafe as the judge had wrongly refused an application for leave to cross-examine the victim, and had put to the defendant, evidence of previous sexual acts of a similar nature. The judge’s attention had wrongly been drawn to s.41(3)(c)(ii) Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 when the matter should have […]
A judge had exercised his discretion fairly under s.41 Youth and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 by ruling as admissible certain evidence about sexual abuse on complainant children by persons other than their parents against whom criminal proceedings had been brought.
