DISCHARGE OF JURY

Where the admission of hearsay evidence of a person who had died was sought under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.116(2)(a), in the proviso in s.116(5), that if the circumstances (namely that person’s death) were caused “(a) by the person in support of whose case it is sought to give the statement…” [then the evidence would be inadmissible], “person” meant the defendant or somebody acting on his behalf, not the deceased person.

A conviction for sexual assault was safe, even though a central piece of evidence for the prosecution was the hearsay statement of the two-and-a-half-year-old victim. The statement had properly been admitted under the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 art.18(1)(d) and the judge had given appropriate directions to the jury about how it was to be treated.

A judge in an historic sexual offences trial had not erred in declining to discharge a juror who had known a witness’s husband through work only well enough to say hello to in passing. The judge had ascertained that the juror felt that she could remain faithful to her oath and there had been no objectively justified or legitimate doubt as to her impartiality.

A judge had been entitled to continue a trial after one juror was discharged and there was nothing to suggest this had impacted on the fairness with which the remaining jurors had viewed the evidence. The jury had been placed under no pressure to return a verdict and had clearly taken care in analysing the evidence following a fair and balanced direction from the judge.

Evidence prejudicial to the defence and of no probative value that had inadvertently been disclosed at the appellant’s trial had resulted in unfairness to the appellant and it was doubtful, given the importance of his good character to his defence, that any directions could have overcome that unfairness.