EXTENDED SENTENCES

A judge had not erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection on an offender following his guilty pleas to a number of sexual assaults of children under 13. The imposition of an extended sentence, coupled with a sexual offences prevention order, would not have enabled an assessment to be made before release of the success or otherwise of any sex offender programme or other work undertaken in reducing the risk the offender presented.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection, which had been unlawfully imposed following an offender’s guilty pleas to two offences of indecent assault committed before the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 s.225 came into force, was quashed and replaced by an extended sentence.

A sentencing judge had no jurisdiction to vary a sentence once the time period in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.155 had expired. The case of R. v Saville (Peter Davies) [1981] Q.B. 12 provided no authority to the contrary.

An extended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.

An extended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.

The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four-and-a-half years following an offender’s conviction for rape and kidnapping could not be faulted, notwithstanding the judge’s failure to set out her reasons for rejecting an extended sentence in her sentencing remarks. An extended sentence had undoubtedly been discussed at the relevant time, and the offender, who posed a serious risk to vulnerable women, was unlikely to comply with the licence conditions under the extended sentence regime.

In passing sentence for sexual assault, a judge had been entitled to take an adjusted starting point of six years’ imprisonment, as opposed to one of 12 months as recommended in the sentencing guidelines. The offence had been replete with aggravating factors and, save for a guilty plea, devoid of any mitigation. The judge had correctly observed that the guidelines were precisely such: guidelines, not tram lines.

A discretionary life sentence with a minimum term of four years for offences of false imprisonment, committing an offence with intent to commit a sexual offence and sexual assault was manifestly excessive. Such a sentence was to be reserved for the gravest offences and a sentence of detention for public protection with a three-year minimum term was appropriate.

The whole of the term of an extended sentence under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85 constituted the term for which a person was “sentenced to imprisonment” for the purposes of determining the notification period under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.82(1). There was nothing arbitrary or disproportionate about the imposition of an indefinite notification period given the statutory purposes and the existence of review provisions under s.91A to s.91F of the 2003 Act.