“HISTORIC” OFFENCES

A total sentence of eight years’ imprisonment was appropriate for an individual convicted of four counts of historic sexual offences involving a young child. Two of the counts had been part of the same incident and course of conduct and the sentences on those counts were made concurrent rather than consecutive in order to reduce the total sentence.

A seven-and-a-half year custodial sentence was appropriate for an offender convicted of historic sexual offences against two young children he had babysat when he was a teenager and young adult. The sentence correctly reflected the relevant factors under the modern sentencing regime without exceeding the maximum sentence available at the time of the offending.

An immediate 15-month custodial sentence imposed on a 68-year-old man in respect of offences of incest and indecent assault which he had committed against his younger sister when aged 15 was replaced with a community penalty. The judge had been misled by not being referred to the relevant guidelines for sentencing youths, and he had not been justified in imposing a far harsher sentence than would have been imposed if the offender had been a 15-year-old boy at the time of sentencing.

In a criminal case concerning historical sexual offences, the judge had not favoured the prosecution in his directions to the jury, and the appellate court was not left with any sense of unease about the safety of the convictions.

A sentencing judge had erred in passing sentence for historic offences of indecent assault by referring to a notional sentencing guideline with a starting point midway in the statutory range at the time of the offence rather than adopting the current starting points and the relevant sentencing ranges, subject to the earlier statutory maximum.

A suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment was increased by lifting the suspended element and imposing an immediate two-year custodial sentence, for an offender who had pleaded guilty to ten counts of historic sexual abuse. The court noted that this was an exceptional case, in which the offender had volunteered the fact of a second victim, and said it should not be treated as a precedent.

It had not been an abuse of process to prosecute an elderly man for an historic offence of sexual assault which had been committed against a seven-year-old family member. The 23-year delay between the offence and trial did not of itself justify a stay of prosecution, and the judge had been entitled to determine that the offender, who suffered from dementia and other physical ailments, was fit to plead and stand trial.

When an offender was sentenced for historic sexual offences, he was not to be sentenced on any count to more than the maximum term available at the time of the offending. That said, sentencing had to reflect modern attitudes, and the court could take account of modern sentencing guidelines.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.