s.101

Bad character evidence in respect of complainants in sexual assault allegations had been properly excluded where a judge had decided that it lacked substantial probative value as it did not establish a propensity towards general untruthfulness. That exclusion avoided the inevitable, grossly prejudicial, admission of the accused’s previous convictions for sexual offences.

Sentences totalling 16 months’ imprisonment were unduly lenient, having been imposed following an offender’s guilty pleas to 15 counts of causing or inciting, or attempting to incite, children to engage in sexual activity where the offender had contacted up to 220 children via Facebook. A sentence of four years was appropriate.

Where a defendant, charged with committing sexual offences against his stepdaughters, had attacked the character of one of the victims, the judge had been entitled to allow the prosecution to admit evidence of the defendant’s previous convictions for non-sexual offences in accordance with the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(g).

The erroneous admission of disputed bad character evidence by a trial judge had resulted in the trial of collateral issues which significantly contributed to the lengthening of a trial such that it had been very difficult for the jury to maintain focus. Accordingly, the conviction for rape, sexual assault, false imprisonment, threatening to kill and poisoning was unsafe.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were quashed where the Crown’s reliance on hearsay evidence of bad character in the form of statements containing allegations of rape had circumvented the restrictions on hearsay evidence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

A judge had been correct to admit a defendant’s previous convictions as bad character under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(1)(d), despite their being over 30 years old, since they had relevant factual similarities to the offence charged and were of sufficient probative force.

The judge had been wrong to admit documents, prepared by police officers, giving details of methods used in the commission of offences of which the appellant had been previously convicted, but the appellant’s convictions for the instant offences were nevertheless safe. It was important that the formal procedures referred to in R. v Hanson (Nicky) (2005) EWCA Crim 824 , (2005) 1 W.L.R. 3169 were followed.

There was no power to add an extended sentence to a detention and training order under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85 .