UNDUE LENIENCY

Where a single mother had stabbed to death a man who lived on the same estate and who had been charged with sexual assault on her children, a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment for manslaughter by reason of loss of control had been unduly lenient and was replaced by a sentence of seven-and-a-half years.

Sentences of six years’ imprisonment following a conviction for attempted rape and 30 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently, following a conviction for sexual assault, were not unduly lenient where the judge had taken into account totality, but had been motivated by mercy.

A sentence of six years’ imprisonment following convictions for historic charges of rape, indecency with a child and sexual assault, committed against a 13-year-old girl, was increased to 12 years’ imprisonment where the judge had departed from the sentencing guidelines without giving reasons for doing so and where the sentence imposed failed to reflect the totality of the offending.

A sentence of nine years’ imprisonment, following convictions for three historic offences of sexual assault against a child, was increased to 14 years’ where the offending had been frequent and repeated and where the judge had wrongly constrained himself by the maximum sentence available for a single offence.

A sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, imposed following convictions for four offences of rape and two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, was increased to 16 years’ imprisonment with an extended licence period of five years, where the offender was dangerous and had committed the offences while serving a community sentence for a previous sexual offence.

A total sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment was increased to 20 years where a judge had been wrongly advised that his sentencing powers in relation to offences of buggery committed when the offender was under 18 were limited to 12 months’ imprisonment.

Sentences of nine years’ imprisonment were neither unduly lenient nor manifestly excessive for two offenders who had raped an intoxicated young woman in an alleyway outside a nightclub. It had been appropriate not to impose a consecutive sentence for digital anal penetration by one of the offenders.

A sentencing judge had erred in passing sentence for historic offences of indecent assault by referring to a notional sentencing guideline with a starting point midway in the statutory range at the time of the offence rather than adopting the current starting points and the relevant sentencing ranges, subject to the earlier statutory maximum.

A suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment was increased by lifting the suspended element and imposing an immediate two-year custodial sentence, for an offender who had pleaded guilty to ten counts of historic sexual abuse. The court noted that this was an exceptional case, in which the offender had volunteered the fact of a second victim, and said it should not be treated as a precedent.