ADMISSIBILITY

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were deemed unsafe where a judge had failed to give a jury clear directions as to whether, and if so how, they could rely on the evidence of each victim when considering the allegations made by the other.

Where the admission of hearsay evidence of a person who had died was sought under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.116(2)(a), in the proviso in s.116(5), that if the circumstances (namely that person’s death) were caused “(a) by the person in support of whose case it is sought to give the statement…” [then the evidence would be inadmissible], “person” meant the defendant or somebody acting on his behalf, not the deceased person.

A conviction for sexual assault was safe, even though a central piece of evidence for the prosecution was the hearsay statement of the two-and-a-half-year-old victim. The statement had properly been admitted under the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 art.18(1)(d) and the judge had given appropriate directions to the jury about how it was to be treated.

Convictions for sexual offences were safe despite the fact that material about the complainant had not been disclosed to the defence, because the picture of the complainant put before the jury was nevertheless a sufficiently accurate one.

Evidence of a step-father’s controlling behaviour towards his wife and step-son had been relevant evidence at his trial for 16 sexual offences against his step-daughter, as his defence was that his step-daughter was lying and exaggerating his controlling behaviour and the evidence was relevant to the issue of her credibility. A total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

Although a police interview of a mentally disordered victim had contained leading questions, the judge had not erred in admitting it at a trial for sexual assault of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice as he had been satisfied that the victim’s main account had been given in response to open questions and a reasonable jury could conclude that that account was credible.

Bad character evidence in respect of complainants in sexual assault allegations had been properly excluded where a judge had decided that it lacked substantial probative value as it did not establish a propensity towards general untruthfulness. That exclusion avoided the inevitable, grossly prejudicial, admission of the accused’s previous convictions for sexual offences.

Two appeals against conviction for the sexual abuse of children were dismissed. Although the judge should not have allowed the jury to return their verdicts piecemeal, that had not affected the overall safety of the convictions. However, in trials of sexual abuse cases involving multiple counts, trial judges should invite the jury not to return their verdicts until they had concluded their deliberations on all counts.

Fresh evidence which cast doubt on the credibility of a complainant’s evidence had sufficient impact on the safety of a conviction for rape for it to be quashed. However, the evidence did not have the same impact on the complainant’s credibility in respect of allegations of sexual assault, which were upheld.