PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS

Bad character evidence in respect of complainants in sexual assault allegations had been properly excluded where a judge had decided that it lacked substantial probative value as it did not establish a propensity towards general untruthfulness. That exclusion avoided the inevitable, grossly prejudicial, admission of the accused’s previous convictions for sexual offences.

Two appeals against conviction for the sexual abuse of children were dismissed. Although the judge should not have allowed the jury to return their verdicts piecemeal, that had not affected the overall safety of the convictions. However, in trials of sexual abuse cases involving multiple counts, trial judges should invite the jury not to return their verdicts until they had concluded their deliberations on all counts.

Two convictions for rape were safe where a judge had admitted evidence of an offender’s single previous conviction for sexual assault. The offences all demonstrated sufficiently unusual behaviour, capable of demonstrating the offender’s propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, to permit admission under the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

A judge had erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of a rape complainant regarding her previous convictions, as the evidence was of substantial probative value in respect of the question of whether her allegation was worthy of belief. However, the evidence would have had no significant impact on the jury’s consideration of the specific issues of creditworthiness in the circumstances of the case and the conviction was safe.

A judge had not erred in admitting evidence of an individual’s previous conviction for possessing an indecent image of a child in his trial for rape and sexual assault of a child. It was admissible as evidence relevant to an issue in the case, namely his inappropriate sexual interest in young girls.

A judge had not erred in rejecting a submission of no case to answer in a trial for sexual assault where the only evidence against the accused was identification evidence from the victim. However, when admitting evidence of the accused’s previous conviction, the jury should have been told that the accused had only been included in an identification procedure because of his conviction.

A 30-year delay on the part of a complainant did not render an offender’s convictions for indecent assault, indecency with a child, and rape unsafe as the judge had sufficiently dealt with any prejudice to the offender in his summing up and directions to the jury and there had been other evidence that supported the complainant’s evidence.

The appellant’s conviction for sexual offences committed against a 12- or 13-year-old boy was unsafe given the admission in evidence of his prior conviction for the buggery of a 17-year-old male; the essence of the allegation in the instant case was that the appellant had committed violent, paedophilic offences against the will of a 12- or 13-year-old victim, whereas the buggery offence involved consensual sexual relations with a person who would now be above the age of consent.

There was no support for the proposition that the Criminal Justice (Evidence) (Northern Ireland) Order 2004 had changed the law by prohibiting bad character evidence on its own from constituting, in appropriate circumstances, evidence of identity.