SUMMING UP

Although a judge had unnecessarily and improperly intervened during a defendant’s examination-in-chief, the interventions were not so significant as to materially impair the defendant’s ability to put his case before the jury. The judge’s interventions, combined with deficiencies in his summing-up, had not deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

It was best practice for a judge to direct a jury before the cross-examination of a vulnerable witness that limitations had been placed on the defence counsel and to explain after the cross-examination the type of issues which the defendant would have wished to explore in further detail. Such directions should be repeated in the summing up.

While a judge’s summing-up could have been more clearly expressed, it was not confusing, did not advocate the prosecution case and it did not render the trial unfair. Trial judges were reminded of the guidance and draft directions contained in the Crown Court Compendium. Those directions provided judges with an invaluable resource which, when adapted to the facts of a case, provided an appropriate framework for a legally correct direction.

A judge had not erred in stating that an appellant’s bad character had been agreed during a rape trial in which both the appellant and victim had impugned each other in their evidence. The conviction was safe despite the fact that allegations of past violence by the appellant had been made. The judge’s direction had been adequate to deal with the issue.

A judge had been right to refuse severance of a defendant’s indictment for child abduction from his co-defendants’ additional indictments for rape. The jury had not misunderstood the scope or nature of the case against the defendant, they had been directed carefully and the summing up had been clear.

A judge had not failed to direct a jury properly on the burden and standard of proof in relation to offences of false imprisonment, assault occasioning bodily harm and rape where he had effectively directed the jury that they had to make a choice whether to believe the evidence of the complainant or the defendants.

A judge had not erred in rejecting a submission of no case to answer in a trial for sexual assault where the only evidence against the accused was identification evidence from the victim. However, when admitting evidence of the accused’s previous conviction, the jury should have been told that the accused had only been included in an identification procedure because of his conviction.

Although a judge’s summing up had been defective, in that he had recited large chunks of evidence rather than summarising the defence and prosecution cases, that had not affected the safety of a conviction for sexual assault, it did not deflect the jury from a proper and fair consideration of the issues.

A jury had been given adequate directions in relation to the issue of consent before it found a defendant guilty of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault following a sexual encounter at a party between the defendant and a woman who was heavily intoxicated. The judge had fully dealt with the elements of capacity and it had not been necessary for him to indicate that a drunken consent remained a consent.