ADMISSIBILITY

A judge had erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of a rape complainant regarding her previous convictions, as the evidence was of substantial probative value in respect of the question of whether her allegation was worthy of belief. However, the evidence would have had no significant impact on the jury’s consideration of the specific issues of creditworthiness in the circumstances of the case and the conviction was safe.

The court rejected a submission that photographs of young naked children could not be indecent as a matter of law: that question was for a jury to decide, and any categorisation of those photographs was only useful for sentencing purposes.

A judge had not erred in admitting evidence of an individual’s previous conviction for possessing an indecent image of a child in his trial for rape and sexual assault of a child. It was admissible as evidence relevant to an issue in the case, namely his inappropriate sexual interest in young girls.

Although a judge had erred in not distinguishing between contemporaneous evidence and that which occurred some years after the relevant events, and in directing that a complainant’s evidence of distress could be corroborative of an allegation of indecent assault, any misdirections were immaterial and could not affect the safety of the appellant’s conviction.

In a case where the defendant was accused of sexual offences against his daughter, the judge had been correct to refuse to admit the evidence of a retired psychiatrist and psychotherapist: her thesis of false memory syndrome lacked evidence to support it.

A conviction for rape was not unsafe on the basis that the judge should have permitted cross-examination of the victim about the falsity of previous allegations of sexual abuse by other men. The fact that the victim had made but not pursued those allegations did not provide a proper evidential basis for showing the falsity of those complaints for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100.

In a trial of charges of sexual offences against the defendant’s daughter and granddaughter, the judge had been entitled to rule that the complainants’ various complaints were mutually cross-admissible. Further, the complainants’ evidence had not been contaminated.

A trial judge had correctly ruled that the contents of a conversation revealing details about a rape victim’s previous sexual behaviour were not admissible under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41.

Where a 12-year-old complainant had alleged sexual abuse by her uncle, the trial judge had been entitled to refuse to allow her to be cross-examined about her previous sexual experience. What, if any, sexual experienceshe might have had was not an appropriate area of investigation and was not of substantial probative value in relation to whether she might have been lying about the conduct of her uncle .