CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

Where a 12-year-old complainant had alleged sexual abuse by her uncle, the trial judge had been entitled to refuse to allow her to be cross-examined about her previous sexual experience. What, if any, sexual experienceshe might have had was not an appropriate area of investigation and was not of substantial probative value in relation to whether she might have been lying about the conduct of her uncle .

On the facts of the case, the defendant’s conviction for rape was not rendered unsafe by the judge’s failure, after acceding to a request from the jury for the replaying of the complainant’s ABE interview, to warn the jury not to place too much emphasis on what they had seen during the recording since they had not also viewed, at the same time, the evidence of any other witness, in particular the defendant.

A conviction for attempted rape was quashed following the admission of new DNA evidence taken from clothing worn by the victim at the time of the offence.

A judge had been correct in not permitting a defendant to cross-examine a complainant concerning a telephone recording where the complainant had allegedly confessed to murder, as it was not relevant to the issues in the case, namely whether the complainant had consented to intercourse, and fabricated evidence.

New evidence as to a complainant’s reliability and truthfulness, which was not disclosed at the trial in 2001 of a man charged with indecently assaulting under-age children and attempted buggery of an under-age boy when he worked at children’s homes in the 1970s, would not have affected the safety of his convictions even if it had been admissible.

In the circumstances, the fact that a complainant had made an unfounded allegation of rape against an accused in a retrial did not cast doubt on the reliability of her evidence against him in an earlier trial so as to render unsafe his conviction for sexual assault in that earlier trial.

A judge had not erred in rejecting a submission of no case to answer in a trial for sexual assault where the only evidence against the accused was identification evidence from the victim. However, when admitting evidence of the accused’s previous conviction, the jury should have been told that the accused had only been included in an identification procedure because of his conviction.

In a case in which the defendant failed to mention in interview a matter on which he later relied in his defence, but that matter was one which the jury might find to be a lie in any event, the judge was right to give a direction which combined elements of a Lucas direction and a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34.

The court gave guidance regarding the assessment of a complainant’s mental capacity in a criminal trial when the alleged offences involved proof of a lack of consent.