s.3

Bad character evidence in respect of complainants in sexual assault allegations had been properly excluded where a judge had decided that it lacked substantial probative value as it did not establish a propensity towards general untruthfulness. That exclusion avoided the inevitable, grossly prejudicial, admission of the accused’s previous convictions for sexual offences.

A judge had been right to refuse severance of a defendant’s indictment for child abduction from his co-defendants’ additional indictments for rape. The jury had not misunderstood the scope or nature of the case against the defendant, they had been directed carefully and the summing up had been clear.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.

Magistrates had erred in dismissing the appeal of a convicted sex offender against a decision of a detective, acting on behalf of the chief constable, not to end the offender’s notification requirements.

A judge had not erred in refusing to sever an indictment containing counts relating to separate incidents of murder and sexual assault. The incidents were broadly similar and close in time and there were a number of very significant similarities. The issue as to whether they were wholly disconnected was a matter for the jury.

The court upheld the convictions of a male nurse for several counts of sexual assault upon women patients who were coming round after general anaesthetic in circumstances where the offender claimed that the complainants had experienced false memories as a side effect of the anaesthetic and the judge had given an appropriate direction to a jury in relation to its consideration of the evidence of several complainants for an assessment of the likelihood of the coincidence.

In determining under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.4A(2) whether a defendant, who was unfit to stand trial, was guilty of voyeurism the jury had to be satisfied that he had deliberately observed another person doing a private act for the purpose of his own sexual gratification.

Where an accused convicted of indecent assault of a man had mistakenly been charged under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1) instead of s.15(1) and had been found unfit to stand trial under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.4A, the conviction was unsafe. Section 4A clearly stated that the jury had to be satisfied that the accused had done the act charged. Even though the indictment particulars were accurate, the actus reus of indecent assault on a woman could not be established by an indecent assault on a man.

A total sentence of seven years’ imprisonment with an extended licence period of two years imposed on an offender following his pleas of guilty to three counts of sexual assault was manifestly excessive and was reduced to six years’ imprisonment; further, the extended licence period was not warranted.