INCONSISTENT VERDICTS

Inconsistent jury verdicts on one count of vaginal rape and one count of oral rape, arising out of same incident and given following a direction sanctioned by R. v Watson (Darren Antonio) [1988] Q.B. 690, were an unacceptable compromise and consequently unsafe.

A finding of guilt on one count could not be inconsistent with a failure to reach a verdict on another count as no verdict had been reached on that count.

Where a trial proceeded on the basis that different counts of criminal liability required separate consideration and there was a difference in the cogency of detail in the evidence on the different counts, a decision of the jury was not unlawful due to inconsistency where an offender was found guilty on a count of indecency with a child but acquitted on counts of rape.

A jury had not reached inconsistent verdicts by acquitting an offender on one count of rape of his niece but finding him guilty on another as there were grounds on which it could have reached different views on the offences, including the age of the victim at the time of each alleged offence.

An appeal against five convictions for indecent assault failed, where the defendant had been acquitted of one further count of indecent assault and where the jury had been unable to agree on two others. There was no logical inconsistency between the verdicts.

In relation to a charge of possessing indecent photographs of a child, a jury had been well aware of the issues it had to assess in considering whether a defendant knew that there was a likelihood that automatic “pop-up” mechanisms or redirections to other websites on legal, albeit pornographic, websites would occur and whether if, upon accessing the legal website, the “pop-ups” would contain separate illegal images.

In a trial in respect of a number of sexual offences, an application to cross-examine the complainant about what she had said in the past concerning her previous relationships with men was rightly rejected as being contrary to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 . There was nothing inconsistent with guilty verdicts where sexual acts had been admitted, and acquittals where the sexual act itself had been denied and the issue had been consent.

Where a defendant faced several counts of sexual offences on the same victim, the jury’s verdicts could not be said to be inconsistent where it had convicted the defendant on the only count that had supporting evidence.