RAPE

A judge had erred in focusing on the risk an offender posed to the public, rather than the seriousness of the offences, when imposing what was in effect a whole life order for multiple counts of rape and further counts of kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The very high test of exceptionality for whole life orders had not been fulfilled but, given the aggravating features of the case, a notional determinate sentence beyond the sentencing guideline range was justified.

Two convictions for rape were safe where a judge had admitted evidence of an offender’s single previous conviction for sexual assault. The offences all demonstrated sufficiently unusual behaviour, capable of demonstrating the offender’s propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, to permit admission under the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Although a judge had, without hearing submissions, given a Watson direction which deviated from the approved wording, the direction did not render a conviction for rape unsafe. Whether and when to give a direction was a matter for the judge’s discretion, provided that it was given in a way which did not put pressure on jurors.

A judge had not erred in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of an offender’s bad character, relating to conduct forming the basis of a charge for sexual assault, of which he was acquitted, after it had closed its case as the defence had not yet opened its case. The judge had also directed the jury fairly on the similarities and dissimilarities between the previous incident and the index offence.

A judge had erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of a rape complainant regarding her previous convictions, as the evidence was of substantial probative value in respect of the question of whether her allegation was worthy of belief. However, the evidence would have had no significant impact on the jury’s consideration of the specific issues of creditworthiness in the circumstances of the case and the conviction was safe.

A multiple-counts indictment under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 r.14.2(2), which allowed multiple instances of similar offences to be charged as a course of conduct, would not be properly drafted unless it specified a minimum number of occasions on which the offending was alleged to have happened. Otherwise, where a defendant was convicted on such an indictment, a sentencing judge could not know how many times the jury believed the offence to have been committed, and fairness would require him to sentence on the basis that it was more than once, but no more than twice.

A judge had not erred in stating that an appellant’s bad character had been agreed during a rape trial in which both the appellant and victim had impugned each other in their evidence. The conviction was safe despite the fact that allegations of past violence by the appellant had been made. The judge’s direction had been adequate to deal with the issue.

A suspended sentence which had been imposed on a man who suffered from Tourette’s syndrome and other disorders following his plea of guilty to rape was unduly lenient; however, given his very positive attitude to the suspended sentence order, which had been coupled with a supervision requirement, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the sentence.

A sentence of seven years and two months’ imprisonment following late guilty pleas to three counts of rape was increased to 10 years where the sentencing judge had taken a starting point that had been too low and had given too great a discount for the offender’s pleas and previous good character.