INDICTMENTS

A judge had been right to refuse severance of a defendant’s indictment for child abduction from his co-defendants’ additional indictments for rape. The jury had not misunderstood the scope or nature of the case against the defendant, they had been directed carefully and the summing up had been clear.

Where a person subject to a sexual offences prevention order had pleaded guilty to an indictment which mistakenly alleged that he had breached a sex offender order contrary to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.2(8), the Court of Appeal found the indictment defective and quashed the conviction. It declined to annul the conviction and return the case to the Crown Court, as it had not heard argument on whether the indictment had been so defective as to render the proceedings a nullity. The Crown Prosecution Service was asked to ensure that on the next occasion the issue arose, the court was able to deal with the nullity issue having heard full argument.

A judge had not erred in refusing to sever an indictment containing counts relating to separate incidents of murder and sexual assault. The incidents were broadly similar and close in time and there were a number of very significant similarities. The issue as to whether they were wholly disconnected was a matter for the jury.

It had not been logically inconsistent for a jury to find a man accused of sexual activity with a child guilty of having intercourse with her but not guilty of digitally penetrating her as they were separate incidents and the surrounding circumstances of the latter might have led the jury to be not sure beyond a reasonable doubt.

An error on an indictment in respect of the date of the Act under which a charge of rape had been made was a procedural error that caused no prejudice and did not render the indictment or the trial a nullity, as the offender had been aware of the case he had to meet and the trial had proceeded on the basis of the correct Act.

A sentencing judge had been entitled to refuse to adjust a sentence for newly discovered offences of indecency with a child by reference to what the overall sentence would have been had all the circumstances been known during an earlier sentencing exercise for similar offences where the offender had chosen not to disclose the extent of his offending.

A conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.9 could not be substituted for a conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1), as the indictment based on the 1956 Act could not be said to expressly or impliedly include an allegation of an offence under s.9 of the 2003 Act.

Where an indictment was a nullity by charging an offence of breach of a sex offender order contrary to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.2(8) when no such offence existed at that time, it was impossible to substitute an offence of breach of a sexual offences prevention order contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 on the indictment as its wording precluded any such offence being alleged.

The court considered the proper method of sentencing where sample offences were charged and it was alleged that there had been multiple offending by the defendant.