SENTENCING

A total sentence of four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment imposed on an offender following his conviction for a number of sexual offences committed against his stepdaughter over a five-year period was unduly lenient. The sentence was increased to seven years’ imprisonment.

Following directions from the Lord Chief Justice on the disproportionate use of the judiciary’s scarce resources on hearing sentencing appeals based on a failure to take into account time served on remand, it was clear that that issue should be raised at the sentencing hearing and time limits for such appeals would be applied strictly in future. In an exceptional case, an offender’s sentence for rape was reduced to take account of time when he was subject to a qualified curfew, in fairness to him and where the error had arisen before the guidance, but the guidance would not be departed from in future.

An offender’s conviction for assault by penetration of the vagina had not been inconsistent with his acquittal for offences of attempted rape and sexual assault by anal penetration. Nor could his conviction be overturned on the grounds that the judge had given the jury a Watson direction at the same time as a majority verdict direction, as there was no evidence that the jury had been pressured into delivering compromise verdicts.

A sentence of four years’ imprisonment was appropriate for an offence of sexual assault where the offender had pretended to be a taxi-driver, targeting lone, drunken females, and where he had prevented his victim from leaving his car before taking her to a dark area to assault her in extremely frightening circumstances. As the force was minimal and there was no attempt to undress his victim or degrade her in any way, a sentence of six years’ imprisonment was too long.

The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four-and-a-half years following an offender’s conviction for rape and kidnapping could not be faulted, notwithstanding the judge’s failure to set out her reasons for rejecting an extended sentence in her sentencing remarks. An extended sentence had undoubtedly been discussed at the relevant time, and the offender, who posed a serious risk to vulnerable women, was unlikely to comply with the licence conditions under the extended sentence regime.

A sentencing judge had been entitled to refuse to adjust a sentence for newly discovered offences of indecency with a child by reference to what the overall sentence would have been had all the circumstances been known during an earlier sentencing exercise for similar offences where the offender had chosen not to disclose the extent of his offending.

A sexual offences prevention order should have been drafted to prohibit the offender from contact with girls under 16, rather than girls under 18. Nevertheless, he was still bound by the order whilst it was in force and his breach of it, by sending text messages to a 16-year-old, encouraging her to send naked photographs, and meeting her for sexual activity, merited a sentence of six months’ imprisonment.

A sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, for six counts of gross indecency with a child was unduly lenient where the offender’s lack of contrition had seriously aggravated his offending, and was replaced with two years and three months’ imprisonment, not suspended.

The purpose of the legislation making it a crime punishable with imprisonment to have sexual relations with those under 16 years was to protect those under 16. A reduction of punishment on the basis that the victim encouraged the commission of the offence was wrong. The victim’s vulnerability was an aggravating rather than a mitigating feature.