SENTENCING

In response to concerns that the principle of double jeopardy was no longer referred to in judgments of the Court of Appeal in references made by the Attorney General, the court expressed its view that, although the double jeopardy principle remained for consideration in the kind of case identified in Attorney General’s Reference (Nos 14 and 15 of 2006) [2006] EWCA Crim 1335, the practice had evolved so that no reference was made to it, save in the rare category of case in which it was likely to arise.

On the first occasion that the Court of Appeal considered the application of the revised Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline, effective from 1 April 2014, to offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.30, it considered how to approach a case of multiple offending.

Where there had been confusion during the jury’s return of verdicts on four counts of an indictment against two co-defendants, and a verdict against a count of kidnap was not formally entered against one defendant, that defendant had not been convicted of kidnap. The court therefore ordered the Crown Court record to be amended accordingly and the defendant’s sentence for kidnap was quashed.

A sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a senior police officer who had been convicted of a number of sexual offences against his wife and teenage boys. In a case of this nature, where the offending spanned a long period of time and where there had been significant changes in the legislation, Crown counsel should ensure that assistance was given to the judge in relation to his sentencing powers.

A trial judge had correctly ruled that the contents of a conversation revealing details about a rape victim’s previous sexual behaviour were not admissible under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41.

On the facts of the case, the defendant’s conviction for rape was not rendered unsafe by the judge’s failure, after acceding to a request from the jury for the replaying of the complainant’s ABE interview, to warn the jury not to place too much emphasis on what they had seen during the recording since they had not also viewed, at the same time, the evidence of any other witness, in particular the defendant.

In a case in which the defendant failed to mention in interview a matter on which he later relied in his defence, but that matter was one which the jury might find to be a lie in any event, the judge was right to give a direction which combined elements of a Lucas direction and a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34.

A judge had been wrong to commit a child for trial in the Crown Court for a sexual offence because, taking into account the child’s previous good character and the fact that he was 11 years old at the time of the offence, there was no real prospect that the Crown Court would exercise its powers under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.91 to impose a custodial sentence.

An extended sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.