SUSPENDED SENTENCES

The court upheld a sexual harm prevention order, imposed for an indefinite duration, where an offender had received concurrent suspended prison sentences of 18 months after pleading guilty to three offences of possession of indecent photographs of a child and one offence of possessing an extreme pornographic image. Although the order had been imposed in circumstances which were far from satisfactory because the judge had not given explicit reasons to support the making of an indefinite order, the offender had given no indication whatsoever that he would address his offending behaviour and its causes. An order for an indefinite duration was necessary and proportionate.

A term of two years imprisonment suspended for two years imposed for seven counts of sexual assault of a child over 13, which occurred 20-25 times over a five-month period on an eight-year-old girl was unduly lenient. Although the judge had given reasons for departing significantly from the relevant sentencing guidelines by reference to the offender’s “childlike mentality” and vulnerability, that did not justify such a departure and the appropriate sentence was one of three years’ imprisonment.

A sentence with a minimum term of nine years and three months’ imprisonment imposed for nine counts of rape was quashed as the minimum term had been wrongly increased by six months to reflect a breach of a suspended sentence imposed for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. The offence for which the suspended sentence had been received was not a specified offence and therefore should not have been added to the minimum term.

A suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment was increased by lifting the suspended element and imposing an immediate two-year custodial sentence, for an offender who had pleaded guilty to ten counts of historic sexual abuse. The court noted that this was an exceptional case, in which the offender had volunteered the fact of a second victim, and said it should not be treated as a precedent.

A suspended sentence which had been imposed on a man who suffered from Tourette’s syndrome and other disorders following his plea of guilty to rape was unduly lenient; however, given his very positive attitude to the suspended sentence order, which had been coupled with a supervision requirement, it would not be appropriate to interfere with the sentence.

A sentence of two years’ imprisonment imposed on a 44-year-old woman who had pleaded guilty to three offences of sexual activity with a 14-year-old boy was unduly lenient. Although the offences had been out of character, there were several aggravating features, including the disparity in age, the fact that the offender took advantage of the victim’s inebriation, a breach of trust, and a lack of remorse.

A suspended sentence for seven offences of indecent assault on step-siblings of a very young age, carried out over a protracted period some 20 years earlier, had not been unduly lenient. The interruption to the offender’s treatment programme that an immediate custodial sentence would cause, and the potential resulting exacerbation of the situation, amounted to an exceptional circumstance justifying the suspended sentence under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.118.

Where a trial proceeded on the basis that different counts of criminal liability required separate consideration and there was a difference in the cogency of detail in the evidence on the different counts, a decision of the jury was not unlawful due to inconsistency where an offender was found guilty on a count of indecency with a child but acquitted on counts of rape.

The imposition of a suspended custodial sentence for a basic offence of voyeurism was inappropriate where the offender had pleaded guilty and was a man of good character.