s.225

An extended sentence comprising a 12-year custodial term and a five-year extension period was appropriate in the case of an offender who had vaginally and anally raped a friend, handcuffing her and pressing a pillow over her face. A discretionary life sentence was not justified.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a prisoner who had been sentenced to imprisonment for public protection when his offence pre-dated the coming into force of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 failed. The sentencing judge had had competent jurisdiction to direct both imprisonment and a minimum term. Her order could not, therefore, be ignored as a suspected nullity; it had to be obeyed unless and until it was set aside on appeal.

A judge had not erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection on an offender following his guilty pleas to a number of sexual assaults of children under 13. The imposition of an extended sentence, coupled with a sexual offences prevention order, would not have enabled an assessment to be made before release of the success or otherwise of any sex offender programme or other work undertaken in reducing the risk the offender presented.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection, which had been unlawfully imposed following an offender’s guilty pleas to two offences of indecent assault committed before the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 s.225 came into force, was quashed and replaced by an extended sentence.

A total sentence of five years’ imprisonment imposed for two sexual assaults was manifestly excessive and was reduced to three years. The judge had been entitled to find that the aggravating features moved the offences out of the third category in the definitive guideline for sexual assault, but he had erred in passing a sentence on one count which was at the starting point of the first category.

The decision of R. v Smith (Nicholas) [2011] UKSC 37, [2011] 1 W.L.R. 1795 did not undermine the long-established practice that the assessment of dangerousness involved addressing the question whether or not an offender would be dangerous when he would otherwise be released from a determinate sentence; it underlined the principle that the decision whether to make an order of imprisonment for public protection could only be made at the date of the sentencing hearing.

A minimum term of five-and-a-half years’ imprisonment for committing an offence with intent to commit a sexual offence was reduced to four-and-a-half years, because it was disproportionate to the five-year starting point for an actual single offence of rape.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed following a plea of guilty to sexual offences was upheld where, having regard to the facts of the case and the offender’s previous convictions, the judge had been justified in concluding that he posed a significant risk of causing serious personal injury. However, the specified minimum term of two years was modified to take into account time the offender had already spent in custody.

The judge had erred in principle in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection in respect of the appellant’s sexual assault of a child under the girl of 13; repetitive violent or sexual offending at a relatively low level without serious harm did not of itself give rise to a significant risk of serious harm in the future.