NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Where an offender had distributed an indecent photograph of a girl under the age of 18 contrary to the Protection of Children Act 1978 s.1(1)(b), but it was unclear if the girl was under 16, a notification requirement should not have been imposed on him. He had not been convicted of an offence listed within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 Sch.3, which was necessary to impose a notification requirement. There was a clear discrepancy between those provisions, and the court would have to be alive to that discrepancy when discharging its duty under the Criminal Procedure Rules and, if necessary, decide whether a child’s exact age could be resolved.

A person subject to the notification requirements of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 who wished to challenge a decision of a magistrates’ court to uphold a refusal to review the notification requirements should bring an appeal by way of case stated rather than pursue an application for judicial review.

The practice of police officers visiting the homes of registered sex offenders for the purpose of monitoring their behaviour under arrangements made pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.325 did not constitute an unlawful interference with the offenders’ rights under the ECHR art.8.

Magistrates had erred in dismissing the appeal of a convicted sex offender against a decision of a detective, acting on behalf of the chief constable, not to end the offender’s notification requirements.

A victim surcharge order imposed against the appellant was unlawful as his offences had been committed prior to October 1, 2012, when an order could only be imposed if the defendant was sentenced to a fine, which was not the case with the appellant.

The whole of the term of an extended sentence under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85 constituted the term for which a person was “sentenced to imprisonment” for the purposes of determining the notification period under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.82(1). There was nothing arbitrary or disproportionate about the imposition of an indefinite notification period given the statutory purposes and the existence of review provisions under s.91A to s.91F of the 2003 Act.

Despite a substantial delay in applying for judicial review, it was in the public interest to quash a court’s decision purporting to lift a sexual offender’s notification requirements. The court lacked power to make that order, and the grant of relief upheld the rule of law and ensured that all applications to life notification requirements were dealt with under the same procedure.

An extended sentence was reduced on appeal to less than 30 months even though the offender had already served the sentence. The judge had imposed the lengthy extension period in order for the defendant to attend a sex offender treatment programme, but had not intended the consequence that the defendant would remain on the sex offender’s register for life.

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.82 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.8 in subjecting certain sex offenders to notification requirements indefinitely without the opportunity for review. As a matter of principle, an offender was entitled to have the question of whether the notification requirements continued to serve a legitimate purpose determined on a review.