RAPE

A prosecutor’s decision not to charge a man with the rape of a woman with learning difficulties was not irrational. The circumstances of the man’s acquittal some years earlier on charges of sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice were such that the prosecutor had been right to conclude that the man would be able to establish that a second prosecution was an abuse of process.

Evidence of a step-father’s controlling behaviour towards his wife and step-son had been relevant evidence at his trial for 16 sexual offences against his step-daughter, as his defence was that his step-daughter was lying and exaggerating his controlling behaviour and the evidence was relevant to the issue of her credibility. A total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

Given the aggravating factors involved in the sexual assault and subsequent rape of the same victim, a judge had been entitled to set the minimum term of a life sentence at over twice the upper limit of the respective sentencing guideline range. However, the sentence was too high and was reduced from nine-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half years.

A sentence with a minimum term of nine years and three months’ imprisonment imposed for nine counts of rape was quashed as the minimum term had been wrongly increased by six months to reflect a breach of a suspended sentence imposed for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. The offence for which the suspended sentence had been received was not a specified offence and therefore should not have been added to the minimum term.

Sentences of six years’ imprisonment following a conviction for attempted rape and 30 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently, following a conviction for sexual assault, were not unduly lenient where the judge had taken into account totality, but had been motivated by mercy.

The failure to provide exceptions to the law in Northern Ireland prohibiting abortion in respect of fatal foetal abnormality at any time, and pregnancies due to sexual crime up to the date when a foetus became capable of an existence independent of its mother, was contrary to the ECHR art.8.

A conviction for sexual offences against a child was safe, as medical evidence adduced as fresh had not permitted confident review of a previous diagnosis so as to describe it as ill-founded; taken at its highest it neither supported nor refuted the allegations against the offender. The defence was still that any abuse was perpetrated by another and the jury had decided on the non-medical evidence.

A sentence of six years’ imprisonment following convictions for historic charges of rape, indecency with a child and sexual assault, committed against a 13-year-old girl, was increased to 12 years’ imprisonment where the judge had departed from the sentencing guidelines without giving reasons for doing so and where the sentence imposed failed to reflect the totality of the offending.

A sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment, imposed following convictions for four offences of rape and two offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, was increased to 16 years’ imprisonment with an extended licence period of five years, where the offender was dangerous and had committed the offences while serving a community sentence for a previous sexual offence.