RAPE

A judge had not diluted a good character direction by directing a jury that to the extent that they accepted evidence of misconduct additional to that contained on the indictment, they would want to consider whether that evidence reduced the weight which they gave to the fact that the defendant had no previous convictions.

It was doubtful whether there was still a rule that prosecuting counsel could not make a closing speech where the accused was unrepresented. It was preferable to approach the issue as a matter of balance and fairness: it was incumbent on a trial judge, faced with an unrepresented accused, to assess all the circumstances of the case and decide whether it would be fair to allow prosecuting counsel to make a speech.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.

The requirement in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 Pt 67 to give immediate notice of an intention to seek permission to appeal against a terminating ruling was a mandatory pre-condition to establish appeal jurisdiction. Prosecution counsel’s failure to give such notice, where he had withdrawn from the case due to professional embarrassment but remained ostensibly holding the prosecution brief, meant that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider an application for permission to appeal.

An acquittal on counts of rape and assault by penetration would be quashed and a retrial ordered where the complainant had left the country after giving an achieving best evidence interview and the Crown had offered no evidence at trial. There was new and compelling evidence in the form of the complainant’s evidence which was available when she returned to the country, and a retrial would be in the interests of justice.

Where the failure by police to conduct an effective investigation into allegations of rape had been held to amount to breaches of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the ECHR art.3, the victims of the rapes were entitled to a financial remedy for harm caused by the police failings on top of sums received in civil claims for the harm caused by the rapes. The court examined the statutory framework, relevant legal principles, previous authorities, and the existence of alternative remedies, and awarded sums of £22,250 and £19,000 respectively.

A conviction for rape was not unsafe on the basis that the judge should have permitted cross-examination of the victim about the falsity of previous allegations of sexual abuse by other men. The fact that the victim had made but not pursued those allegations did not provide a proper evidential basis for showing the falsity of those complaints for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100.

The appellant’s conviction for the rape of his wife was unsafe, given fresh evidence from witnesses which cast doubt on the testimony given by the complainant.

In a trial of charges of sexual offences against the defendant’s daughter and granddaughter, the judge had been entitled to rule that the complainants’ various complaints were mutually cross-admissible. Further, the complainants’ evidence had not been contaminated.