SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1956 s.14(1)

An offender who had been incorrectly convicted of indecent assault instead of gross indecency with a child had his appeal against conviction allowed and his sentence reduced to six years’ imprisonment.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection, which had been unlawfully imposed following an offender’s guilty pleas to two offences of indecent assault committed before the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 s.225 came into force, was quashed and replaced by an extended sentence.

When an offender was sentenced for historic sexual offences, he was not to be sentenced on any count to more than the maximum term available at the time of the offending. That said, sentencing had to reflect modern attitudes, and the court could take account of modern sentencing guidelines.

The court gave guidance on a jury direction required in relation to establishing the elements of the offence of indecent assault.

A conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.9 could not be substituted for a conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1), as the indictment based on the 1956 Act could not be said to expressly or impliedly include an allegation of an offence under s.9 of the 2003 Act.

Where an accused convicted of indecent assault of a man had mistakenly been charged under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1) instead of s.15(1) and had been found unfit to stand trial under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.4A, the conviction was unsafe. Section 4A clearly stated that the jury had to be satisfied that the accused had done the act charged. Even though the indictment particulars were accurate, the actus reus of indecent assault on a woman could not be established by an indecent assault on a man.

It was impermissible for the Crown to prosecute a charge of indecent assault under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1) in circumstances where the conduct upon which that charge was based was only an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl aged under 16 in respect of which no prosecution could be commenced under s.6(1) of the Act by virtue of s.37(2) of, and Sch.2 to, that Act.