SENTENCING

A 16-year extended sentence for the rape of an ex-partner was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle where the judge had been entitled to conclude that the offender was dangerous and a post-sentence report documented no change in mentality. There could also be no proper complaint about a concurrent 12-year sentence imposed for a second count of rape against the same victim.

Certain conditions of a sexual harm prevention order imposed on an offender who had committed sexual offences against children, which restricted his use of computers, mobile phones with internet access and remote storage, were quashed as they were disproportionate, unenforceable and did not give effect to the statutory purpose.

A judge had not erred when sentencing an offender to life imprisonment, with a minimum term of 10 years, as a sentence of “last resort” for extreme child sex offences committed over a number of years against his own children. The sentence was also not unduly lenient, despite the minimum term not being increased when the offender was sentenced for further offences which involved the same children being offered to other men for sexual purposes.

Evidence of a step-father’s controlling behaviour towards his wife and step-son had been relevant evidence at his trial for 16 sexual offences against his step-daughter, as his defence was that his step-daughter was lying and exaggerating his controlling behaviour and the evidence was relevant to the issue of her credibility. A total sentence of 22 years’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.

Given the aggravating factors involved in the sexual assault and subsequent rape of the same victim, a judge had been entitled to set the minimum term of a life sentence at over twice the upper limit of the respective sentencing guideline range. However, the sentence was too high and was reduced from nine-and-a-half to eight-and-a-half years.

Where a 19-year-old offender had taken advantage of a 12-year-old girl’s willingness to engage in sexual activity there were no exceptional circumstances that justified a non-custodial sentence; a community order was replaced by a sentence of three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment.

Where a single mother had stabbed to death a man who lived on the same estate and who had been charged with sexual assault on her children, a sentence of 42 months’ imprisonment for manslaughter by reason of loss of control had been unduly lenient and was replaced by a sentence of seven-and-a-half years.

A sentence with a minimum term of nine years and three months’ imprisonment imposed for nine counts of rape was quashed as the minimum term had been wrongly increased by six months to reflect a breach of a suspended sentence imposed for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. The offence for which the suspended sentence had been received was not a specified offence and therefore should not have been added to the minimum term.

Sentences of six years’ imprisonment following a conviction for attempted rape and 30 months’ imprisonment, to be served concurrently, following a conviction for sexual assault, were not unduly lenient where the judge had taken into account totality, but had been motivated by mercy.