SEXUAL ASSAULT

A conviction for sexual assault was safe where a judge had refused to grant an adjournment to allow the defence time to contact a witness mentioned by the victim for the first time in her evidence in chief. Instead the judge had admitted hearsay evidence which indicated that the witness would not have been able to support the victim’s case.

Alleged failures in pre-trial investigation procedure did not affect the safety of the convictions of soldiers found guilty of kidnapping, sexual assault, theft and assault occasioning actual bodily harm.

Although a police interview of a mentally disordered victim had contained leading questions, the judge had not erred in admitting it at a trial for sexual assault of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice as he had been satisfied that the victim’s main account had been given in response to open questions and a reasonable jury could conclude that that account was credible.

Bad character evidence in respect of complainants in sexual assault allegations had been properly excluded where a judge had decided that it lacked substantial probative value as it did not establish a propensity towards general untruthfulness. That exclusion avoided the inevitable, grossly prejudicial, admission of the accused’s previous convictions for sexual offences.

Fresh evidence which cast doubt on the credibility of a complainant’s evidence had sufficient impact on the safety of a conviction for rape for it to be quashed. However, the evidence did not have the same impact on the complainant’s credibility in respect of allegations of sexual assault, which were upheld.

Two convictions for rape were safe where a judge had admitted evidence of an offender’s single previous conviction for sexual assault. The offences all demonstrated sufficiently unusual behaviour, capable of demonstrating the offender’s propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, to permit admission under the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

An appellant who had faced a number of counts relating to offences arising out of the same sexual encounter had failed to establish that his conviction on two of those counts was rendered unsafe by the jury’s failure to reach a verdict on the remaining counts.

A judge had not erred in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of an offender’s bad character, relating to conduct forming the basis of a charge for sexual assault, of which he was acquitted, after it had closed its case as the defence had not yet opened its case. The judge had also directed the jury fairly on the similarities and dissimilarities between the previous incident and the index offence.

An extended sentence of 39 years, with a custodial term of 33 years, imposed in respect of a very large number of serious sexual offences against young girls was manifestly excessive; the appropriate custodial term was 30 years. The judge had also erred in adding up the consecutive sentences to reach the overall custodial term before imposing an extension period on the total: it was the overall extended determinate sentences that had to be consecutive, not just the custodial terms.