INDECENT ASSAULT

A sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a 63-year-old man who had been convicted of numerous sexual offences against three teenage boys.

A judge had not erred in refusing to stay proceedings for abuse of process in a trial concerning sexual offences which took place after the death of a defence witness, where there was no suggestion that the witness would have given unique or striking evidence, and the judge had properly directed the jury on the matter so as not to render the trial unfair.

A conviction was quashed where credibility had been the key issue in a sexual offences case and the judge had given an unclear good character direction that was tantamount to a bad character direction.

A conviction for indecent assault was quashed where prejudicial witness evidence rendered the conviction unsafe. It was not appropriate to order a retrial owing to the antiquity of the proceedings and the defendant’s old age and failing health.

A sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed for 12 counts of committing indecent assault was reduced to 12 years in the light of the maximum sentence for each offence, the sentencing guidelines, the offender’s age and disability, and the fact that for a historic offence he would serve two-thirds of his sentence in custody.

A conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.9 could not be substituted for a conviction under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1), as the indictment based on the 1956 Act could not be said to expressly or impliedly include an allegation of an offence under s.9 of the 2003 Act.

Where a family member had been convicted of the indecent assault of two children of the family, notwithstanding inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence of the complainants, the judge had been entitled to leave the matter to the jury. In her directions to the jury, the judge had dealt fairly and clearly with the issue of alleged collusion, contamination and cross-admissibility, and had given commonsense guidance when reminding the jury that it was dealing with the evidence of children: the conviction was not unsafe as a result of the judge’s comments.

Although cross-examination which had invited impermissible speculation by the defendant should not have been allowed, that was insufficient to support a conclusion that his conviction for rape, buggery and indecent assault was unsafe, there being no other basis on which to undermine the jury’s acceptance of the significant DNA evidence.

Where an accused convicted of indecent assault of a man had mistakenly been charged under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1) instead of s.15(1) and had been found unfit to stand trial under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.4A, the conviction was unsafe. Section 4A clearly stated that the jury had to be satisfied that the accused had done the act charged. Even though the indictment particulars were accurate, the actus reus of indecent assault on a woman could not be established by an indecent assault on a man.