SUMMING UP

A judge receiving fresh prosecution evidence during the course of a trial might have put undue pressure on a defendant to change his plea by indicating that he would give a reasonable amount of credit if he did so. However, the incident could not lay the foundation for an allegation of bias because the defendant had continued to maintain his innocence and the judge had continued to conduct the trial entirely fairly.

In a trial involving aggravated burglary and sexual offences a judge had fairly summed up the evidence and the convictions could not be said to be unsafe. However, the total sentence of 16 years was manifestly excessive and was reduced to 12 years’ imprisonment.

Although cross-examination which had invited impermissible speculation by the defendant should not have been allowed, that was insufficient to support a conclusion that his conviction for rape, buggery and indecent assault was unsafe, there being no other basis on which to undermine the jury’s acceptance of the significant DNA evidence.

Where an accused convicted of indecent assault of a man had mistakenly been charged under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.14(1) instead of s.15(1) and had been found unfit to stand trial under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 s.4A, the conviction was unsafe. Section 4A clearly stated that the jury had to be satisfied that the accused had done the act charged. Even though the indictment particulars were accurate, the actus reus of indecent assault on a woman could not be established by an indecent assault on a man.

Deficiencies in a judge’s summing up were such as to render a conviction for historic child sex offences unsafe.

Although a judge’s summing up and jury directions could have been more detailed and better tailored to the facts, they were not so deficient as to affect the safety of a conviction for the commission of sexual offences.

Where a trial proceeded on the basis that different counts of criminal liability required separate consideration and there was a difference in the cogency of detail in the evidence on the different counts, a decision of the jury was not unlawful due to inconsistency where an offender was found guilty on a count of indecency with a child but acquitted on counts of rape.

The aim of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.15(1) was to penalise those who used a relationship which they had developed as a platform from which to launch sexual offending. In the instant case, there was more than a substantial body of evidence corroborating the complainant child’s version of events which justified the jury reaching the conclusion that the offender had arranged to meet her for the purposes of a sexual assault.

A judge had been right in refusing to order the further disclosure of diaries kept by a complainant who had alleged indecent assault by her mother and step-father where the prosecution had stated in open court that they contained no reference to the allegations made. What was important to the defence was the admitted absence of any reference to abuse in any disclosed diary, and the refusal of further disclosure had not been unfair nor prejudicial and did not render the mother and step-father’s convictions for indecent assault and indecency with a child unsafe.